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In early 2017, the government approved an 8% rise in the national 
minimum wage, bringing it to €707.6 per month (from €655.2), in 
14 monthly payments. Moreover, on 22 November 2016, the 
Spanish Congress agreed to consider a legislative proposal on a 
phased increase of the national minimum wage to €800 per month 
by 1 January 2018 and €950 per month by 1 January 2020. This 
box aims to analyse the possible effects of these rises on 
employment and the wage structure.
The existence of a mandatory minimum wage below which 
employment contracts cannot be entered into is widespread 
among developed countries, the main aim being to enhance social 
equity. From a strictly economic standpoint, however, the 
theoretical literature emphasises that a minimum wage can also 
have an adverse impact on employment for certain groups of 
workers, especially those whose productivity level is below the 
minimum wage set by the authorities. Although the empirical 
evidence and the wide variety of findings available on the effects 
of minimum wage rises are not conclusive, increases in the 
minimum wage tend to be identified with adverse, albeit modest, 
effects on employment. For example, Belman and Wolfson (2014)1, 
in compiling the findings of a broad range of studies, mostly 
relating to the United States labour market, have found adverse, 
but limited, effects on employment in about two thirds of them, 
with employment elasticity to the minimum wage of around-0.1% 
on average2.
In the case of Spain, the estimates made by Galán and Puente 
(2015)3 show that increases in the minimum wage between 2005 
and 20104 significantly raised the probability of employment loss, 
although the impact on aggregate employment was limited, given 
the low percentage of workers affected by the national minimum 
wage in Spain5. In this study, which uses the microdata contained 
in the Social Security administrative labour records (Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales, hereinafter MCVL), the group of 
workers affected by increases in the national minimum wage is 
defined as those whose wages in a given year are lower than the 
following year’s national minimum wage. For this group of workers, 
employers must decide whether to adjust the wage to the new 
mandatory minimum or else terminate the employment relationship. 
To analyse the effects on employment for this group of workers, a 
model has been estimated on the probability of employment loss 
in the 12 months following a rise in the national minimum wage. In 
addition to different control variables, this model includes a 
measure of the existing gap between a worker’s current wage and 
the new minimum wage. The coefficient of this variable can be 
interpreted as the effect of the minimum wage rise on the 
probability of employment loss6. As a result, the probability of 
employment loss following a rise in the minimum wage rose 
significantly for younger workers (aged 16 to 24), middle-aged 
workers (aged 33 to 45), and particularly for older workers (aged 
45 or over). Thus, the average probability of affected workers 
losing their employment within a year rose from 11.2% to 24.9% 
in the 16-24 age band as a result of cumulative increases in the 
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16-25 15.72 4.87 0.76 20.46 10.93 2.24 32.57 17.52 5.71
25-33 5.57 1.58 0.09 8.53 3.21 0.27 18.01 4.70 0.85
33-46 1.47 2.23 0.03 3.43 4.69 0.16 10.00 7.24 0.72
46-70 1.27 6.36 0.08 2.87 13.66 0.39 7.97 20.65 1.65
16-70 3.09 3.46 0.11 5.30 7.48 0.40 12.26 11.32 1.39
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Table 1
EFFECT ON EMPLOYMENT (a) 
4  There was a cumulative increase of 37.5% (18.7% in real terms) in the 
minimum wage. 
5  Specifically, the wage rises implemented between 2005 and 2010 
affected only 0.6% to 0.9% of all workers per year. These figures are 
higher among certain groups, such as younger workers (between 1.1% 
and 2.2%).
6  Account should be taken of the fact that this effect underestimates the 
possible effect on total job destruction, since it centres only on job 
losses, not on the creation of new jobs. This bias will be greater insofar 
as workers’ productivity gains are higher owing to the experience they 
have gained, sufficient to offset increases in the national minimum wage. 
This offsetting effect is not available for workers seeking employment 
and, thus, for this group, the effects on job creation will be greater than 
on job destruction. Therefore, it is expected that the effect on 
employment for younger workers, who have the greatest experiential 
learning opportunities, will be underestimated.
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minimum wage during the period analysed (2005-2010)7, while the 
corresponding impact on workers aged 45 or over was much 
greater, with the probability rising from 11.2% to 49.9%8.
This analysis can be used as the basis for estimating the potential 
effect of the aforementioned newly approved rise in the minimum 
wage9. To this end, a microsimulation exercise has been performed 
using the estimated probabilities, where each worker affected by 
the new minimum wage is assigned to one of the following two 
groups: workers who keep their employment and whose wages 
increase to match the new mandatory minimum amount, or 
workers who lose their employment. This exercise has been 
carried out for the minimum wage already approved in 2017 and 
also for the two proposals mentioned earlier, which involve raising 
the national minimum wage to €800 and €950.
Table 1 shows the results of this simulation for the three minimum 
wage increases considered. In terms of currently affected workers, 
the rise approved in 2017 gives a percentage of 3.1%, above the 
figures estimated for the 2005-2010 period (around 0.75% per 
year). By age group, the differences are considerable, since 15.7% 
of younger workers would be affected by the minimum wage rise, 
compared with a much lower figure of around 1%, among older 
workers. Naturally, these figures are higher for the scenarios of 
additional increases in the national minimum wage until 2020. 
These results show that, in the event of an increase of up to €950 
per month, the percentage of affected workers would reach 
12.3%, with almost a third being younger workers.
As regards the loss of employment resulting from these increases, 
a relatively limited potential impact is estimated for the economy 
as a whole. Specifically, the aggregate effect on employment 
would be a fall of 0.1% in the case of the minimum wage increase 
approved in 2017, and of 1.4% for the proposed rise to be 
achieved by 202010. For workers affected by the increase, the 
potential loss of employment could reach 3.5% in the case of that 
approved in 2017, and 7.5% and 11.3% in the case of the 
proposed increases of €800 and €950, respectively. By groups of 
workers, the probability of employment loss for workers affected 
by the national minimum wage is higher among younger workers 
and higher still among older workers. 
This exercise allows for the estimation of the impact of the increase 
in the minimum wage on total labour income and its distribution. As 
can be observed in Chart 1.1, in aggregate terms, the minimum 
wage rise has a limited impact on aggregate wage income, since the 
positive effects on workers who remain employed tend to be offset 
by the loss in wage income of those who lose their jobs. However, 
the changes are more significant as regards the distribution of wage 
income across different population groups. In particular, there are 
substantial differences by age band, with higher average income 
among younger workers, for whom the wage rise more than offsets 
employment losses. In contrast, for the group of workers aged 45 or 
BOX 5 THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT RISE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Ministry of Employment and Social Security and Banco de España.
a Prepared with data from the 2015 Social Security administrative labour records (MCVL) (full-time workers who have worked the full month). National minimum 
wage on a pro-rata basis (12 annual payments).
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Chart 1  
EFFECT ON TOTAL EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INEQUALITY (a)
 16-25 YEARS  25-33 YEARS  33-46 YEARS  46-70 YEARS  16-70 YEARS
7  This probability is the result of simulating the cumulative increase in the 
minimum wage between 2005 to 2010 on the wage distribution observed 
in 2004.
8  Overall, the results would imply an elasticity of employment to minimum 
wage of around -0.2% for younger workers, in line with studies 
conducted on other countries, albeit very limited for aggregate 
employment, given given the low percentage of workers affected by the 
national minimum wage in Spain. However, it should be noted that the 
effects of the minimum wage on employment are not linear, since the 
number of affected workers for each additional euro is greater the higher 
the previous minimum wage level. Special caution is therefore needed 
when extrapolating elasticities to future rises in the national minimum 
wage, since they will generally be greater than previously estimated.
9  Specifically, for each affected worker in 2015 (the latest available year of 
the MCVL), the probability of employment loss is calculated on the basis 
of the worker’s age and the difference between his/her current salary 
and the new national minimum wage considered. For part-time workers 
or those who have not worked a full month, the new minimum is adjusted 
to the corresponding proportion of time worked. 10  This non-linear effect arises for the reasons set out in footnote 8.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2017 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
over, employment losses are so high that labour income declines. 
With respect to the impact on wage inequality, Chart 1.2 shows the 
effects of the three scenarios using the estimated variation of the 
Gini index11. The analysis shows that the aggregate inequality relative 
to wage income distribution hardly varies although the changes in 
inequality by age group are significant, with higher inequality among 
both younger and older workers, particularly in the scenarios of 
additional increases in the national minimum wage.
Overall, the results presented in this box suggest a low aggregate 
impact on employment of the recent rise in the national minimum 
wage, given that the group of workers potentially affected by the 
increases in the national minimum wage is small. However, its 
impact on the probability of employment loss among certain 
groups, such as younger and older workers, is significant. It should 
be stressed that the effects of these increases are relatively limited 
since the minimum wages which are binding for most jobs in Spain 
are those agreed on in collective bargaining processes, and are 
currently higher than the mandatory minimum wage. These effects 
could be greater if the increases in the national minimum wage 
were to be applied to broader groups of workers, for example, if 
they were used as the basis for collective bargaining.
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11  The Gini index is a measure of the degree of inequality across the entire 
income distribution. The more inequality, the higher the index. A totally even 
distribution would give an index of 0 while a totally unequal distribution, 
with all income concentrated in one individual, would give an index of 1.
